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TENNESSEE
City of Murfreesboro v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc., No. M200000562-COA-R9-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. App., Oct. 12,
2001) (holding determination of navigability is an issue for the trier of
fact; if a waterway is determined navigable, the riparian landowner is
not entitled to compensation for the portion of condemned land
below the low water mark because no private ownership rights in a
navigable waterway can exist).
The City of Murfreesboro ("City") condemned 2.36 acres of a 10.5acre commercial tract of land Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. ("Hardy")
owned along the West Fork of the Stone's River. The condemned land
consisted of .61 acres in the riverbed and 1.75 acres along the
riverbank. Hardy's deed described the property as extending to the
center of the river. The condemned property included land at the
bottom of the river from the centerline to the riverbank, the riverbank,
and a strip across the top of the riverbank.
The City filed a motion to have the West Fork of the Stone's River
declared a navigable waterway, contending navigable waterways were
not entitled to private ownership; therefore Hardy was not entitled to
compensation for the condemned land. The City supported its
contention by asserting the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") determined the waterway was navigable and gave public
notice of that determination. In addition, the City argued, due to the
federal government's asserted jurisdiction over the river, it was
navigable. The trial court held in favor of the City, and stated the river
could neither be privately owned nor owned by the state. Hardy
appealed.
The court examined the Corps' determination that the West Fork
of the Stones River was a navigable waterway, and stated the
determination bound Corps activities, but not federal courts, and
therefore did not bind Tennessee courts.
While the Corps'
determination may be accorded "substantial weight," the court stated,
Hardy was entitled to introduce contrary proof.
No federal court had determined the West Fork of the Stones
River a navigable waterway. The court stated a determination of
navigability by the Corps for federal purposes did not equate to the
same finding for state regulatory purposes. "The federal government
has ... dominant control over navigable waters used in interstate
commerce for purposes and to the extent necessary to protect
interstate commerce." However, that control applies to the waterway,
not to ownership of the underlying soil. The court stated ownership of
the bed and banks of navigable waters is generally a matter for state
determination, subject to the United States' interest that they remain
accessible for interstate commerce and foreign commerce.
Navigable waters in the United States are public. Neither the state
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nor riparian owners can interfere with their use. When the United
States does not hold title to land upon which navigable waters lie,
ownership determination of the navigable waters and the soil beneath
them lies with states.
The court stated that the district court correctly identified the
elements of the test for navigability: "a navigable waterway of the
United States must (1) be or have been; (2) used to susceptible of use;
(3) in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; (4) as a
highway for interstate commerce."
Due to the lack of evidence on the navigability of the West Fork of
the Stones River, aside from the notice by the Corps, the court
reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded for determination
by the trier of fact based on evidence relevant to that determination.
The court stated if the West Fork of the Stones River was
determined navigable, the riverbed was not subject to private
ownership. As a result, Hardy would not be entitled to compensation
of the condemned land below the low-water mark. In Tennessee,
grants of land along navigable streams extend to the low-water mark
only, and tide to the streambed remains with the state. If the waterway
is navigable, the soil covered by water and the use of the stream
belongs to the public. Therefore, any deed Hardy had only conveyed
property extending to the low-water mark.
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TEXAS
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 00-0436, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 13
(Tex. February 14, 2002) (holding that the Edwards Aquifer
Authority's adoption of well-permitting rules falls within the exception
to the Property Rights Act for actions taken under a political
subdivision's statutory authority to prevent waste or protect rights of
owners of interest in groundwater).
Upon being denied a permit application for one of their two pecan
orchards, Glenn and JoLynn Bragg ("Braggs") brought suit against the
Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") and its general manager.
The Edwards Aquifer Act ("EAA") created the Authority to manage
groundwater withdrawals from the aquifer through a permit system.
The EAA charged the Authority with carrying out the state legislature's
mandate of conservation. The legislature anticipated that an increased
withdrawal of water from the aquifer could cause a drought with
potentially devastating effects.
The issue in the case hinged on the Authority's adoption of rules
governing the issuance of well permits. The permit system gave
preference to "existing users," which the EAA defined as people who
withdrew and beneficially used the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993.
The Braggs only accessed the aquifer by means of a well on one of

